

Institute of Distance and Open Learning

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GAUHATI UNIVERSITY

MA in Philosophy

(Previous Year)

Paper III

CONTEMPORARY WESTERN PHILOSOPHY



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Paper Introduction:

This paper consists of two halves. The first half includes the philosophical thought of Bradeley and Husserl and the second half includes the philosophical thought of Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein. Bradeley introduced idealistic. Tendencies in recent philosophy and Husserl Russell and More introduced realistic tendencies in recent philosophy. Wittgenstein was a logical positivist.

First Half-

In Unit one you will come to know about Bradeley's views on concepts and entities, his distinction between appearance and reality, his ethical thinking and his views on value and absolute reality.

In unit Two you will come to know about the philosophical thought of Husserl. Husserl was the main exponent of phenomenism. Here you will know- what is phenomenology, concept of bracketing and concept of intentionality.

In unit Three will come across the philosophy of Sartre on Existence. Here you will understand the philosophy of Sartre on Existentialism, existence precedes essence, Man and Freedom etc.

Second Half-

In unit one you will come to know about Russel's philosophical thought. Here you will know Russell's view on the necessity of the application of the scientific method in philosophy, necessity of a logically perfect language, importance of logical analysis, and difficulties in Russell's analytic method.

In Unit two you will come to know about the philosophical thought of Moore. Here Moore discusses about the basic proposition of idealism that is "Esse est percipii", thus refutes the subjective theory of knowledge propounded by Berkeley and paves the way for the "common sense" theory.

In unit three you will come to know about the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Here you will know about the central ideas of his basic works "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus" and "Philosophical Investigations". His views on facts and propositions, logical atom, Family resemblance and language game.

This paper has the following six units-

FIRST HALF:

- Unit 1: Bradley**
- Unit 2: Husserl**
- Unit 3: Sartre**

SECOND HALF:

- Unit 1: Russell**
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First Half

Unit: 1

BRADLEY

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1.1 Introduction

The influence of science upon philosophy has always been powerful; post-Kantian idealism continued to cling to its positions and to extend its battle lines. Moreover, there had been found immediate German reactions to Hegel's teachings. We have also noted that Coleridge in England fought for idealism and particularly for Schelling and attacked contemporary British Empiricism and Skepticism. Among the enthusiastic and powerful adherents we find T.H. Green (1836-1882) and F.H. Bradley (1846-1924). They are really noteworthy. Green waged war on both the ethical and the metaphysical fronts. On one hand, in his book 'Prolegomena to Ethics', he attacked utilitarianism which was ably defended by H. Sidgwick (1838-1900). Further, he opened fire against the positivism and naturalism of which Spencer was the chief exponent. He argues that the ways in which we think things and the relations we establish between the elements of experience can not be derived from sense perceptions. Hume and Mill and the other empiricists were against it. To connect sense data with one another and to weave relations between them, there must be something over and above experience—for example, a rational self. So far Green went with Kant.

But, like the German idealists, he could not see eye to eye with him so far as things-in-themselves were concerned. Such was the background which prevailed when Bradley appeared.

1.2 Concepts and Entities

Bradley launched a wider offensive, not only against the naturalistic-positivistic-empirical point of view but upon idealisms of the Berkeleian type and all forms of pluralism generally. Let us take, for example, a so-called thing. It is there, and it is something. That is, it has qualities. We treated moreover as if were more than its qualities, and call it a substance. But what is this substance? Is it identical with its qualities? In that case, we are denying the distinction between subject and predicate and rendering sentences and discourse mere meaningless babble. There is no sense in 'predication' qualities of a substance if it is nothing but these qualities. Is the substance there different from its qualities? In that case, when we say, for instance, that the apple is red we are stating that it is what it is not. Do we say that the distinction of the apple from its redness lies in its being also round? But roundness is not redness. Therefore, if the apple is an apple by virtue of being round as well as red, it is an apple by virtue of combining two logically contradictory qualities, red with not red, and round with not round.

Let us suppose, however, the empiricists reaffirm the position that a thing is nothing but the some of its qualities, and reinforce their contention by maintaining that so called substance, in which qualities inhere, is to be regarded as merely the togetherness of those qualities. It is a relation between them. But we must then admit that the subject or substance 'apple' is spread out over all the qualities which are together. It is equally there in its redness, its hardness and its roundness. In that case, however, when we say that the apple is round and hard, what do we mean by apple? Plainly we are restricting the apple to its redness, which we have no business to do; then again we turn 'round' and 'hard' into qualities of that redness which also we have no business to do.

We can say that the apple is red and round—in which case we locate the apple in its hardness and assert its hardness to be red and round or this can be stated thus; by saying the apple is hard and red - in which case we identify it with its roundness and regard red hard as objectives predicated of that roundness. All the qualities that are together may be treated both as subjects and predicated, and the relation between them remains as a third something, different from any of the qualities it relates. But if it is different from them, how can it relate them without itself being related to them by something which is neither it nor they?

The Nature of Reality:

Along with apple we have to dismiss everything empirical, scientific, metaphysical, and theological that has anything to do with things, qualities and relations. Matter and motion, space and time, cause and effect, selves and egos, Gods and

Absolutes, are all riddled by the same contradictions. They thus remain, however, a kind of core which is positive. Reality must be free from contradictions. It must somehow include all appearances. It must somehow make sense of all their nonsense, since otherwise it would lose its own consistency. To make sense of them it must itself be a single system in which everything is related. It must be an experience of some sort, since being is meaningless apart from being perceived. It must be one experience, not many, since a plurality of centres of consciousness would put it back in the apple-cart.

Further more, our own experience is immediate and the multiplicity in unity. It is an overcoming of incompleteness—though by methods that involves us in self contradictions.

Our knowledge is a thing of degrees. The moral life lifts us from the lower to the higher. Aesthetic experience suggests reaches or beauty beyond what is immediately felt. The manner, then, in which the absolute experience includes us and our experiences, would seem to be one in which the higher contains the lower, the greater degree the smaller, the more real the less real. Appearance is a manifestation in a lesser and varying degree truer than we can know, more beautiful than we can feel, better than we can be. Our ‘higher’ experiences lie nearer to the heart of things and them we might know and feel again if we were perfect as God is perfect. The ‘lower’ being more partial, must receive in the Absolute its supplementation.

We have discussed so far Bradley’s ideas of concepts and entities and ideas of reality. We have seen this British Neo-Hegelian attempts to reconcile one and many reality and appearance—in a different way. Bradley is an inclusive harmony which comprehends all elements in it without contradiction. The Absolute is the all-inclusive reality in which all appearances or incomplete realities, are included, re arranged and harmonized. It is a harmonious whole which includes all aspects of infinite experience, without parting and relating them. Bradley’s Absolute is akin to Hegel’s Absolute spirit, which is not simply reason or thought, but also feeling and willing which are not differentiated into the plurality of objects and minds and relates them to one another. Secondly, Bradley’s Absolute is a non-relational unity in which the elements of plurality are not separated from, and related to one another, while the latter is an all-embracing whole or unity in which the elements of plurality are different from, and related to one another. The former does not contain relations within it, while the latter contains them. The former is a non-relational whole, while the latter is a relational whole. But inspite of these differences, both are organic in nature, in which the finite elements are contained in the Absolute and dependent on it and on one another.

Bradley starts from the principle of contradiction as the supreme criterion of every reality, applies it to all scientific concepts and intellectual categories—substance, quality, relation, space, time, motion, change, causality, force, activity—which involve contradictions from his point of view, and are, therefore, appearances of incomplete realities.

Let us consider the relation between substance and qualities. Substance is not identical with any of its qualities; nor is it an aggregate of all of them. If sugar were identical with sweetness, it could not be hard at the same time, because sweetness would then be identical with hardness. Nor can sugar be something other than its qualities. Substance is neither an aggregate of its qualities anything different from them. According to Bradley, substance, then, is a link connecting its qualities with one another. Or it is a name for qualities in relation. But this also raises difficulties. The question is—how is one quality related to another? Neither of them is identical with the other or with the relation to the other. Quality does not exist apart from relations; but relations can exist only between qualitative terms. Thus, on the one hand, quality is the result of relations, since difference in qualities cannot exist apart from the process of distinction; on the other hand, relations are ultimately forms of quality. Thus, substance and quality are self-contradictory, and are therefore, appearances.

Again, a relation, considered by itself, is nothing. Nor can it be identified with the things related. A is related to B. A relation or B is necessary to relate A to B, then R, being a third entity, requires another relation or R^1 to relate it to A, another relation or R^2 to relate it to B. Again, R^1 , being a distinct entity, requires another relation or R^3 to relate it to A and so on to infinity. Thus relation is self-contradictory, and is, therefore, an appearance. In the same way Bradley shows that space, time, movement, activity, causality and so on are self-contradictory and that therefore, they are appearances. The intellectual categories and scientific concepts are then mere appearances which are harmonized and transfigured in an integral harmonious system. Even the concept of self is self-contradictory and consequently, an appearance because it involves disunity between self and not-self, which can never be resolved. Thus nature and self are appearances.

Stop to Consider:

Let us understand what exactly Bradley does in regard to the concept of relations. The concept of relations definitely occupies a central position in the thought of Neo-Hegelians like Bradley and others. And it is in regard to the concept of relations that the realists, including Moore, Holt and other have waged a severe war against the Neo-Hegelians. Now the concept of relations can be understood in the light of two

separate heads- general relations and knowledge relations. According to the theory of general relations, relations are internal i.e, they modify or determine the nature of the terms related. The universe is an organic whole where in the parts among themselves and the whole and the parts determine each other. It is an inter-related system of things having inseparable relations. But the realists do not subscribe to the Neo-Hegelian view sponsored by Green, Bradley and others. According to the realists, the universe is a mere sum total of many independent entities. It is not an organic whole.

According to Green, for example, relations being internal, determine the nature of things related. All objects are the products of thought relations. The universe is the result of self-differentiation of the Absolute. Terms and relations are inseparably co-related.

Bradley also believes that relations are internal to the terms. Bradley proves that the idea of external nature of relations will lead to infinite regress. Joachim, here, fundamentally agrees with Bradley and maintains that purely external relation is in the end meaningless. The reason is this: A relation, which really falls between two independent entities, is a third independent entity which in no intelligible sense relates the first two.

According to Bradley, the Absolute is non-relational. While reality in human experience is relational, the reality proper is non-relational. According to Bradley all relations are within the ultimate reality, while the ultimate reality itself transcends all relations.

1.3 Bradley's Distinction between Appearance and Reality

When Bradley holds categorically that relation which is self-contradictory is therefore an appearance. Even space, time, movement, activity and causality and so on are self-contradictory and therefore they are appearances. What does Bradley mean by all these? It may be presumed, according to Bradley, that appearances are 'incomplete realities' and not mere non-entities. There is no truth which is entirely true, just as there is no error which is completely false. Error is partial truth. Appearance is incomplete reality. All appearances are real in some way or other, and to some extent, and they are rightly arranged, transformed, supplemented and merged in the Absolute, a harmonious whole of experience.

Reality is free from conflict and self-contradictions. Therefore, it must be one. Reality is harmonious and consequently one. Many independent reals cannot be free from conflict. Secondly, reality is individual. It is not Kant's noumenon or thing-in-itself which excludes phenomena. Curiously enough, Bradley's reality includes phenomena, and is the all-embarrassing whole. It is a concrete whole. It is a concrete universe which includes all diversities of phenomena within itself.

Thirdly, reality is experience. Nothing is given to us but experience. Experience constitutes existence. It is the stuff of reality. It is the same as reality. Immediate experience gives us a rough idea of reality, which is a harmonious whole of undifferentiated experience.

Bradley has distinguished between reality and appearance sometimes formally and sometimes materially. Formally, what can unconditionally be asserted to exist is real; what can be asserted to exist, only if some conditions are satisfied, is an appearance. Materially, what, ever exists by itself or is self-consistent, is real; whatever exists as dependent on something else, is an appearance. In the light of discussion made above it is palpably clear that reality must be free from contradictions. It must somehow include all appearances. It must somehow make sense of all their non sense, since otherwise it would lose its own consistency. To make sense of them it must itself be a single system in which every thing is related. It must be one experience, not many, since a plurality of centers of consciousness would put it back in the applecart.

Besides, our own experience is immediate, and a multiplicity in unity. It is an overcoming of incompleteness- though by methods that involve us in self contradiction. Bradley insists that though the phenomena do not exist outside the Absolute, but exist within it, they do not all exist in the same degree. There are degrees of reality among the phenomena. Of two appearances the one, which is more wide, more harmonious, is more real, because it approaches nearer to a single, all-inclusive individuality and because it will require a smaller alteration to remedy its imperfections. The appearance, which will require less rearrangement and addition to be converted into the Absolute, is more real. This is what Bradley means by degrees of reality. Though body and self are both appearances, and consequently unreal, the self is more real than the body, because the self has greater self-consistency and self-completeness than the body.

Our knowledge is a thing of degrees. The moral life lifts us from the lower to the higher. Aesthetic experience suggests reaches of beauty beyond what is immediately felt. The manner, then, in which the Absolute experience includes us and our experiences, would seem to be one in which the higher contains the lower. Appearance is thus a manifestation of in the lesser and varying degree of something truer than we can know, more beautiful than we can feel, better than we can be. Our "higher" experiences lie nearer to the heart of things and then we might know and feel again, if we are perfect even as God is perfect. The "lower" must receive in the Absolute a supplementation.

Thought separates the 'what', the ideal meaning, the predicate, from the 'that' the subject, the existence which is immediately felt. Error consists in uniting a 'what' and a 'that' which do not correspond to each other. In the harmony of the

whole each 'what' will find is proper 'that'. The ideal will correspond to the existent. The ideal of knowledge is the re-union of idea and fact which intellectual thought can never attain because it separates the 'what' and the 'that', the predicate and the subject. The ideal can be attained by intuition or psychic, spiritual or sentient experience.

1.4 Criticism of Bradley's View of Appearance and Reality

Bradley's thought has been criticized in the same way as Bergson's intuitionism. According to Bradley the ideal of knowledge is not attainable by sentient experience, but by integral experience which does not reject sentient experience and intellectual thought. This kind of thought removes contradictions and discrepancies and harmonizes in a unity.

The principle of a non-contradiction, which is Bradley's criterion of reality, is a law of judgement or thought. Judgement and distinction between conceptual terms are appearances relative to our finite point of view. The principle of contradiction is but a law of appearances, and not applicable to absolute reality. Hegel is right in assuming contradiction to be in the heart of reality, from which all development springs. If finite thought as Bradley holds, is an appearance, the principle of contradiction cannot be regarded as an absolute criterion of reality. If it is its certain criterion, then finite thought is not an appearance. If finite logical thought is not an appearance, it at least partially corresponds to reality, and intellectual knowledge does not falsify reality. Multiplicity and transformation, then, as we directly experience them, are not contradictory in themselves, and consequently illusory appearances, but partial aspects of reality. Permanence and change, substance and quality, cause and effect, and so on, are partial and correlative aspects of reality. It is wrong to maintain that they are appearance, because they are inter related to one another. If we analyse reality into these elements for the sake of comprehending its nature adequately, we shall have to synthesize them into a unity for the same reason. The contradiction between these abstract concepts vanishes, if we substitute the reality directly experienced in its fullness for them.

Bradley wrongly argues that the relation between A and B is a self-subsistent entity, and therefore requires an infinite number of other relation to be related to A and B. Relation subsists between A and B, and is not self-subsistence. Relation appears to be self-contradictory, because it is assumed to be independent of the relata. Similarly substance does not exist independently of quality and qualities do not exist independently of substance. They are correlative aspects of a reality. Substance is a connecting principle among its qualities. Bradley starts with the assumption that partial aspects of an intuited reality are self-subsistent, independent

and unrelated, and therefore fails to connect them with one another and treats them as appearances.

Bradley's conception of the super personal or impersonal Absolute does not satisfy our religious aspiration. He regards morality as relative to human intellect and consequently an appearance. The Absolute is not the negation of morality, but embodies the truth and essence of morality. The super moral and super personal Absolute Experience does not harmonize with our moral and religious consciousness.

Bradley conceives the Absolute as Absolute Experience, which transmutes or appearances in its all-embarrassing harmony. He distinguishes between God and the Absolute. According to him, the Absolute is supra-personal or impersonal but God is personal, whose personality implies the duality of the worshipper and the worshipped. The Absolute is beyond all duality and relation, and transmutes all finite experiences with their contradictions in an ineffable way. God is an aspect, an appearance of the Absolute. An appearance is an incomplete reality.

We have already seen that the Absolute is, according to Bradley, non-relational. The most important question regarding the knowledge relation is whether it makes any change in the object. The knowledge relation is an organic and internal relation between the mind and the object. Mind not only perceives an object but also creates it. Bradley is definitely an idealist. He argues that an object cannot be both related and unrelated at the same time without involving self contradiction.

1.5 Bradley's Ethical Thinking

The most notes worthy feature of Bradley's thinking lies in his approach to ethical thinking. A distinctive statement of an idealistic type of ethics was given by F.H. Bradley. In his book 'ethical studies' he developed the concept of self-realization.

"The self we try to realize" wrote Bradley, "is for us a whole; it is not a mere collection of space". The whole self is present in its states and self-realization does not merely want us in some state or states. If therefore, to realize self is always to realize a whole, the question for ethics is to find the true whole. If this true whole is realized, the true self as well would be realized. By consideration of the nature of knowledge, Bradley endeavoured to show that the human mind is not merely finite. Thus for Bradley "realize yourself" means "be an infinite whole." "I am finite; I am both finite and infinite, and that is why my moral life is a perpetual progress. I must progress because I have an other which is to be and yet never quite is myself, and so as I am, I am in a state of contradiction." The finite, private self cannot become a whole unless it joins a whole: it must know and will itself as a member of a whole. "The final end with which morality is identified, on under

which it is included, can be expressed not otherwise than by self-realization, only however if by that is meant realizing one-self as the self-conscious member of an infinite whole by realizing that whole in one self. The question whether Bradley himself is explicitly aware of the fact or not is not the moot question; Bradley has not derived the substance of morality from the idea of an infinite whole. So far as ethics is concerned, this type of metaphysical exposition is no more successful than that of Green. He had to turn to something more immediate, more empirical. So he passed abruptly to the idea that the whole in which the self is to realize itself as a self-conscious member is the social community. The community is the "real moral idea". A man has to realize him-self in and through "my station and its duties". Each man belongs to society in the capacity of someone—either a cultivator or a teacher or a doctor or a pleader or a community-worker and so on. What a man has to do depends on what his place is, what his function is and all that comes from his station in society. Bradley says that there is nothing better than a man's station and his duties, nor anything higher, nor more truly beautiful. The question is— is this adequate for a description and understanding of morality? Any given community in which the individual self may have its station and its duties may itself be the subject of moral judgements of approval and disapproval. Further, can the moral aspirations of the individual be fully included in his station and duties in a community? Bradley acknowledged these difficulties but did not explain their implications; he himself admitted that we "cannot confine a man to his station and his duties". Bradley saw further that we may still ask the question, "What is the higher whole in which the individual is a function".

The perfectionists hold that the inherent spiritual element is more competent to be realized than the elements which give happiness or satisfaction to human beings. What is this inherent spiritual element in man? It is not simply rational but an outcome of various characteristic elements.

According to F.H Bradley, man is born in a particular social environment and with a particular aptitude; upon all these his nature of duty depends. Self-realization or perfection is the attainment of that ideal which is consistent with the inborn mental aptitude of the man in question. Through this ideal the man tries to develop his personality and do some good to the entire human society. Hence, self-realization of different individuals lies in the full fruition of the inborn mental aptitude of them.

"The context of the ideal self does not fall within any community", is "in short not merely the ideal of a perfect social being". Nevertheless, in his enthusiasm for his conception of 'my station and its duties', Bradley had said that the view bids us say farewell to visions of super human morality, to ideal societies, and to practical ideals generally.

In course of his discussion Bradley could not Evade consideration of the apparent opposition expressed by two terms in ethical language- self-realization and self sacrifice. It is a common characteristic in human life that the individual is at times called on to choose between what appears on the one hand to be for the realization of his own self and what on the other appears to be for the realization of a good for others to the sacrifice of his own self. Bradley treated the opposition as only appearance. Self-sacrifice is itself self-realization. Passing from the notion of self-realization to the conception of the realization of an infinite whole, Bradley came eventually to the use of the term perfection.

Stop to Consider:

Bradley has not only thrown light on metaphysics but also on ethical thinking. Bradley's ethics is no less conspicuous than his ideas about metaphysics. Bradley has not derived the substance of morality from his conception of the infinite. Bradley is more closely allied with Green's views in respect of morality than in respect of metaphysical implications. He is unwilling to put extra stress on self realization as a concept which lies far away from us and which is to be realized by us. According to Bradley, the whole self is present in its states and self realization is not merely wanting our selves in some state or states. So his slogan is: "realize yourself" which means "be an infinite whole." The most interesting part of Bradley's ethical thinking is this: the moral life is a perpetual progress. He may not emphasize self realization as something to be realized; but it is the final end with which morality is identified.

There is nothing that this implied for him other than the whole as infinite. There is nothing which justifies its specific implication of an infinite organism of excellences of the character usually approval as moral quantities. The infinite whole is as such perfect. Where there is perfection there is no place for morality which involves struggle against the imperfect. Therefore, according to Bradley, the moral point of view holds only within the process of history. In discussing the nature of the self, he said that it is not merely finite: it is infinite. It is impossible not to draw the conclusion that as a reality the self is already perfect and that morality is illusory. For Bradley self-realisation and self-sacrifice, the good of the self and the good of the community were ultimately at one.

SAQ :

Expalin Bradley's conception of the nature of reality (in 80 words).

.....
.....
.....

Check Your Progress:

1. How does Bradley launch an offensive against the subjective idealism of Berkeley?
2. How does he think of reality?
3. What is the speciality of Bradley's ethics?
4. Why does Bradley treat the opposition between self-realization and self-sacrifice as only appearance?
5. How does he distinguish between appearance and reality?

1.6 Bradley's Views on Value and Absolute Reality

We cannot affirm categorically that value is subjective. It has definitely a real existence as well. The moment we admit the real existence of value, we cannot deny the relation of value for Absolute Reality. What does Bradley opine in this respect? According to him, Absolute Reality has its own position much above value or the ideal. From the side of the individual or in the eyes of the individual, values like truth, goodness and beauty have definite significance; but the Absolute Reality which includes both the individual and the non-individual within itself does not consider value to be real. According to Bradley, the idea of value is full of self-contradiction and hence it has no real existence. Value is, according to Bradley, an appearance. Value is not mere imagination; hence it has existence. Conversely, if it is real, it must exist in space and time. But curiously enough, value cannot be perceived to exist in space and time. Hence, we cannot uphold that value is real. Then value is both existent and non-existent but it is an absurdity. Hence, according to Bradley value has no existence.

Instead of posing the problem in the above way, we can say that Bradley does not like to consider Absolute Reality visa-vis anything else. The Absolute is a systematic rational totality of all experience, the whole nature of which is expressed in every part; in its wholeness every part finds its explanation and its completion. The Absolute is only real individual but when we come to the question of value, we cannot assert the same thing in the same way.

1.7 Summing Up

Bradley, a British Neo-Hegelian, attempts to reconcile one and many- reality and appearance- in another way. He conceives the Absolute as an inclusive harmony which comprehend all elements in it without contradiction. The Absolute is the all inclusive reality in which all appearances or incomplete realities, are included, rearranged and harmonized. Lastly, Bradley has said that the super

moral and super personal Absolute Experience are not harmonized with our moral and religious consciousness.

Appearance is a manifestation in a lesser and varying degree of something truer than we can know, more beautiful than we can feel, better than we can be. The “lower” being, more partial, must receive in the Absolute a supplementation such that, felt as God feels them, we should not know them.

1.8 References/Suggested Readings

Richard wollheim : T. H. Bradley

Aliotta : Idealistic Reaction Against Science.

* * *

Unit: 2

HUSSERL

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2.1 Introduction

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) as a philosopher is renowned for his exposition of the method called phenomenological method. In the 20th century. Phenomenology is used almost exclusively for the philosophical method and a movement which attempt to describe our experience directly, as it is, separately from its origins and development, independently of the causal explanations that historians, Sociologists or psychologists may give. Husserl describes phenomenology as the description of subjective process of consciousness of objects. Phenomenology analyses and describes phenomena as they are presented to consciousness. It is descriptive analysis of subjective phenomena, without reference to their epistemological or metaphysical implications. A phenomenon is not a mere appearance. A phenomenon is not a mere appearance as Kant supposed. It examines the meaning and universal relations in experience. It describes. Ideas and analyses objects as mere objects, as revealed in consciousness, without referring to objects in spatial and temporal world. As a matter of fact Husserl does not accord any ontological status to phenomena, as presented in consciousness of objects. He is committed to Realism. He discovers three factors in consciousness- a) act, b) content, and c) object. This unit however, is an attempt to introduce to the reader the total philosophical standpoint of Husserl together with his method called phenomenology.

2.2 Objectives

In this unit attempt has been made to-

- Introduce Husserl's account of logic
- Analyse Husserl's expositions directing towards the new philosophy of phenomenology
- Discuss the nature of phenomenological Reduction and the method of Bracketing
- Provide the concept of transcendental phenomenology.

2.3 Husserl's View on Logic

Husserl attacked Mill's psychological approach to Logic. Mill had said to Logic that "as far as it is a science at all, its theoretic grounds are wholly borrowed from psychology". Husserl objects to this statement and says that Kant had already said in his "Critique of Pure Reason", that psychological laws are no more than inductive generalizations subject to further experience, where as logical and Mathematical principles are "necessary" - they must be true - and therefore cannot be grounded upon inductively derived premises.

Husserl's determination to preserve the necessity of the laws of Logic - and of fundamental mathematical principles, which he thinks are derived from them— led him to attempt the construction of a pure logic, entirely free from merely empirical and psychological premises, and thereby secure against all risks of errors. Such a project had already been embarked by the "Symbolic logicians". Husserl was a mathematician by training and might have been expected to cooperate with them. But in fact, he was severely critical of the new Formal Logic. He maintained that formal Logic worked with concepts, which it never examined. It does not examine the ground of its own operations. At best it can provide us with a particular calculus, a particular method of solving a particular problem - but a pure logic must go farther than that. It must be a theory of every possible calculus, every possible type of reasoning. Husserl defines pure logic as "the scientific system of ideal theories which are grounded in the fundamental concepts, which are the common province of all sciences, because they determine in the most general manner what makes science a science— in every employment of Reason". Logic can be identified neither with calculation, in the manner of symbolic logicians, nor with a description of procedures of inductive logicians. He admits that symbolic and inductive logic can be of value in their own particular sphere - and so can the psychological study of thinking process - but they cannot be logic proper, as Husserl conceives it, because they lack the requisite certainty

and generality. He believes that the construction of a genuinely 'pure' logic demands the use of phenomenological method.

2.4 Way Towards Phenomenology

At first, Husserl sometimes characterized phenomenology as "Descriptive Phenomenology". But his phenomenology neither adopts the stand point nor employs the methods to arrive at a pure theory which will be independent of contingent empirical facts. Of course, the possibility of such a pure, non-empirical theory has been challenged by many thinkers. They argue that a 'truth' is no more what at a given epoch men are willing to believe. Husserl argues that the "relativists" presume the existence of absolute truths in the very act of denying that they exist; even to put forward their own theory the relativists have to treat it, and give evidence for it, as absolutely true. - The empiricists, on different grounds, had also attacked the idea of pure logic and Husserl's reply to their objections, gives us the information regarding the fundamental point in his theory. On the traditional empiricists view, we are directly acquainted only with "particular existence" any general theory must be constructed by generalisation out of them, if it is to bear any relation to the facts of experience. A non-empirical theory then could be nothing but a fabrication. Husserl however rejects what he regards as the "mere presumption", that we are directly aware only of "particulars". In his "Ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy", he said "The truth is that every one sees ideas, essences, so to speak, continuously; they work with them when they think and they also pass judgment about them. But from their theoretical stand point, people explain them away". He illustrates this point by an examination of Hume's "Treatise". When Hume is classifying 'mental acts' perceiving, remembering, imagining and the like - he makes no reference to the existence or non-existence of particular natural objects, except by way of illustration. For example, he describes perceiving as "having an impression", not as "observing such and such properties of physical objects". Thus, in the first place, Hume shows it is possible to proceed in a manner" absolutely independent of the conclusions of every natural science". He simply draws attention to the essence of the real nature of an experiment, no physical observation could have the least relevance to his procedure, whether by way of supporting or undermining it.

Hume might reply that it is only to say that he is a psychologist, not a physicist. But if we look at his procedure, Husserl points out, we notice that he does not, in the manner of an empirical psychologist, continue case histories or refer to comparative observations. Husserl argues that Hume does not ever engage in "introspection", in the sense in which an empirical psychologist might introspect. For when Hume examines his own mind, he is not looking for evidence with

which to test an empirical generalisation, nor is it his object to describe in detail a particular specimen of a mental act. His object is “to intuit no more and no less. To do this Husserl is prepared to admit, that Hume has to consider some particular act of perception, but the particularity of that act has no relevance to his conclusion - his concern is solely with the ‘essence’ which that act exhibits. If, then Hume were right in his general metaphysical presumption that all our experience is of particulars, his own position would be unintelligible.

Hume is so blinded by his own presumptions that he does not see the implication of what he is doing. He believes himself to be an empirical psychologist, while in fact, he is engaged in a “pure” psychological analysis of the mind, intuiting directly the essence of various mental acts. Similarly, according to Husserl, only a self-inflicted blindness prevents philosophers from realising that every time they examine numbers, they are taking a general concept, not a “generalization from experience”, as their subject - matter. When it is said that two objects are both “red”, the statement carries with it the intuition of a general properly, an “essence”. Husserl says that philosophy must get itself free from all metaphysical presuppositions, it must investigate what actually confronts it, not allowing any metaphysical fantasy to distract it from its direct analysis of “essence” or “general structures”. And to proceed thus, on Husserl’s first understanding of the term, is to be “phenomenological”. Husserl’s “logical investigations”, then, are meant to exemplify a strictly presupposition less, wholly scientific, phenomenological approach to philosophical questions - which, just because it is strict, is logically prior to, and must not imitate, the natural sciences. These investigations are extremely minute in nature, rich in distinctions. Indeed, in philosophical style, as well as in their choice of topic, and, in part, in doctrine, they anticipate much, that was to be typical of twentieth century British philosophy.

Husserl’s initial object is to demonstrate that Empiricism is untenable. He distinguishes two different aspects of a statement : the statement as an event in the life of a particular person, and the statement as what the person “means”. Now it is clearly possible for two persons to make the same statement, in the sense of meaning the same thing, even though, considered as a particular event, every statement is a unique combination of a certain intonation, a certain loudness, a certain emphasis, a certain method of pronunciation. Husserl asked, can the empiricist explain how two statements can be identical in meaning? On his general nominalist principles, the empiricist would have to reply, Husserl suggests, that the identity of meaning consists in the fact that the two statements in some respects are “similar”. But Husserl says that if we look for similarity, all we can discover is similarity in intonation, emphasis and the like, i.e. a similarity between the statements considered as particular events, we shall never arrive at the meaning, which unites

them, as distinct from a resemblance in their manners of utterance. It takes “direct insight”, Husserl concludes to grasp the meaning of a statement. And it follows that the meaning is something, of which the empiricist, with his rejection of any avenue of knowledge, except the comparison of particular experiences, can never give any account. Yet meaning is fundamental to science. Empiricism breaks down, therefore, at a crucial point.

From his analysis of meaning, Husserl makes his way to the conclusion he particularly wishes to sustain that logic must rest on “insight”, and not on empirical generalization. He maintains that logic is interested in statements as “meaning”, not in individual utterances. In other words, it is a theory of ‘proposition’ - understood as that which unites those various statements of judgements, which we recognise as “having the same meaning”. We might ask Husserl- “where does this proposition exist? Is it in the mind or has it a place in the external world?” Husserl would reply that this question “has no sense” - like the parallel question, “where is redness?” Propositions and universals are not entities - not things that exist here or there; they are the unity, or essence, of a set of entities - redness of red things, propositions of statements. He says that the fact remains that we have direct experience of them, an experience, more over, which contains in itself a peculiar self-evidence. In the intuition of such essences, we attain a certainty which lies beyond the reach of any empirical science, which is highly fallible “generalization from experience”. Thus we can understand the necessity of pure logic, which consists wholly in the elucidation of the basic essences - those which are involved in every form of inquiry.

Yet Husserl afterwards thought that the point of view adopted in the “Logical Investigation” was inherently unstable. When some neo-Kantians commented that Husserl had left quite obscure the status of the ordinary world and its relation to “essence”, and that to clarify it, he would be forced back into something like a Kantian metaphysic. Husserl came to agree with this judgment.

2.5 Phenomenological Reduction and the Method of Bracketing

But for ‘Metaphysics’, he hoped to substitute the new discipline of “transcendental phenomenology” - a “universal philosophy, which can supply an organon (means of reasoning) for the methodical revision of all the sciences”. Although he had rejected the empirical doctrine that universals or ‘essence’ are generalizations from experience, his philosophy was still empirical, he thought, in the sense that he simply took experience as it came and tried to describe the general logical features he found within it. What he now wanted to do was to justify his method of procedure, by showing that to take things as they “appear to consciousness” is to see them as they certainly are. In the tradition of German Idealism, he was in

search of the Absolute, of something itself beyond all criticism, on which all knowledge can exist. He turned for help to Descartes, and particularly to the cartesian “method of doubt, in order to arrive at what lies beyond of risk of doubt. Husserl’s “method of bracketing” followed the same pattern. He began by “bracketing” the actual world, not actually doubting its existence, but “suspending his judgment” about it, in the cartesian manner. By this step he automatically suspended his judgment also about every science of natural objects - psychology and sociology, because they consider man as a natural object, as well as physics and chemistry. In doing this sort of thing we suspend belief in the existence of objects; we perform a “phenomenological reduction”. Husserl argues, “consciousness in itself has a being of its own, which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains . unaffected by the “phenomenological disconnection”. He presumed like Descartes that there is something called “consciousness” which would exist even if nothing else existed, and which is not a “natural object”, since it forms no part of the subject matter of any empirical science. So according to Husserl it is better to concentrate on our experiences and experiencing themselves. Most British philosophers were not prepared to accept this view and they rejected the theory of “transcendental phenomenology”.

Husserl further argues that the existence of consciousness remains unaffected, even if we “suspend our judgment” about the deductive sciences of logic and mathematics as well as the inductive physical sciences, there would still be consciousness. We cannot, without self-contradiction” think away” our consciousness, which is independent of the act of thinking. In Hume’s language, we can ‘suspend our judgment’ about the truths of arithmetic, but we cannot “suspend our judgment” about whether we are capable of judging.

2.6 Transcendental Phenomenology

Husserl concludes that the process of bracketing leads us to the existence of consciousness as the one “absolute” - the one thing that must exist and which cannot be thought away. From that Absolute, we can move back, but from a novel point of view, to the world of objects. We’ approach them now from the stand-point of a “transcendental phenomenology”, considering them as they “declare themselves to consciousness”, and not taking for granted the conclusions of natural science, for which an object is something entirely independent of consciousness. By considering objects only in their dependence upon the Absolute consciousness - we preserve the unity and the certainty of our enquiry. We proceed without pre-suppositions, and accept only what can not be time, as Husserl understands it, is concerned with “time as it appears to consciousness”.

In his subsequent writings Husserl attempted to explain in more detail the nature of transcendental phenomenology, to defend it against critics, and to work out specific phenomenological analyses. Many philosophers followed in his foot steps. But many critics complained that in his later writings Husserl had reverted to Idealism. Husserl has defended himself against the off-repeated charge that his philosophy ends in solipsism. He says that his starting point is consciousness in general, not the consciousness of any particular individual. But he is more than ready to admit his allegiance to German objective Idealism. He says that his work puts Idealism on a scientific basic.

Thus, in Germany, Brentano's emphasis on the object stimulated two very different lines of thought. Meinong pressed objectivity hard, and ended with 'a universe, which is certainly objective, "but very strongly constituted"'. Husserl, in his attempt to establish a secure presuppositionless foundation for an objective logic, finally made his way back to Idealism.

2.7 Summing Up

After reading this unit, you are now able to understand the total philosophical intention of Husserl. According to Husserl, the aspiration of Descartes to frame an absolute criterion of knowledge, that is, to establish our knowledge claims on a necessary and certain ground, is entirely legitimate. But Descartes's way in which he set out to achieve it and the means which he employed were sadly deficient. The reason, Husserl believes, is the absence of a theory of consciousness- of its structure and function. For whatever is known is known only to consciousness. Now whole of Husserl's conviction is directed towards framing such a critical theory of consciousness in its knowing function. Which he calls "Pure phenomenology".

2.8 References/Suggested Readings

- | | | |
|---------------------|---|-------------------------------|
| E. Husserl | : | Ideas |
| M Farber | : | The Aims of Phenomenology |
| J.N. Mohanty | : | The concept of Intentionality |
| J. Passmore | : | A Hundred years of Philosophy |
| P. Edwards (ed.) | : | Encyclopaedia of Philosophy |
| (Relevant articles) | | |
| R.O. Elveton | : | The Phenomenology of Husserl |

Discuss "Standford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy" in Internet.

* * *

Unit: 3

SARTRE

Contents:

- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Objectives
- 3.3 Subject-Matters of Existentialism
- 3.4 Existentialism of J.P. Sartre
- 3.5 Existence precedes essence
- 3.6 Man and Freedom
- 3.7 Being and Nothingness
- 3.8 Atheism
- 3.9 Criticism
- 3.10 Summing Up
- 3.11 Referencec/Suggested Readings

3.1 Introduction

Ever since the inception of reflective thought, the problem of Being and Existence has loomed large in the minds of philosophers and saints and seers. The philosopher of East as well as west, of the ancient as well as modern times have all been seriously preoccupied by the problem of Existence. Modern Existentialism as a philosophical movement has developed in between the two great world wars and particularly after the second world war. Modern Existentialism is concerned more with the problem of. Being than the problem of becoming; more with particulars than universals; more with existence than essence. Kierkegaard is regarded as the father of Existentialism. There are many existentialist philosophers. They are mainly divided into two group- namely; (1) theistic existentialist philosopher and atheistic existentialist philosophers. Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre represent the atheistic group. Along the theistic group come the German philosopher Karl Jaspers and the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel and Danish philosopher Kierkegaard.

3.2 Objectives

After reading this unit you will be able to-

- *know* about existentialism.
- *know* branches of existentialism.
- *write* on Sartre's existentialism.

3.3 Subject Matter of Existentialism

Existentialism as a philosophical movement holds that 'existence precedes essence'. It denies the priority of 'essence' to 'existence' essence according to Existentialism is the inherent universal nature common to all individuals or particular instances of a class. Existence relates to the actual being of the individual. Essence is only conceivable by reason or intellect, but existence can be grasped by one's own immediate experience. Existentialism is attached with the greatest value and importance to the individuals rather than the universal. In ethical and social outlook, existentialists advocate the utmost freedom and responsibility for the individual in ethical, heligious, political, cultural and social matters. In epistemology, the existentialists are usually aniti-rationalists, anti-intellectualist and anti-objectivists. They are frankly and consciously opposed to all metaphysical speculations regarding ultimate things carried on through intellectual concepts and symbols, that cannot penetrate beneath the common husk of reality. Like mystic thinkers the honest motto of existentialist philosophers is to be (to exist) rather than to know.

For existentialism 'Man' is the centre of the universe and nothing else is equal to it. The basic feature of human person is his freedom- unfettered and unrestrained. There is no 'general will' to which the 'individual will' is subject. The existentialist philosophy does not have any definite aim because life being movement and flow which is not mere mechanical change but a creative advance, it is not possible to tie down life to any particulareative advance, it is not possible to tie down life to any particular aim.

3.4 Existentialism of J.P Sartre

Lean pant Sartre (1905-1980) a famous French existenctialist philosopher, a social critic, novelist, play whighter was the leading advocate of the 20th century atheistic existentialist movement. His existentialism has got its exposition in a number of books. Such as 'Being and Nothingness' (1943) 'Existentialism and humanism' (1946), 'The critique of Dialectical Reason' (1960). Sartre was influenced by his teacher, the German existentialist Heidegger (1889-1976).

3.5 Existence Precedes Essence

Existentialism can be defined as a philosophical movement which holds the following dictum : 'existence precedes essence'. Sartre asks "what do we mean by 'existence precedes essence?'" , 'hle mean' Sartre answers himself "that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up the world-and defines himself afterward" (Existentialism and Humanism). Sartre says that- "Existentialism is a doctrine that does render human life possible, a doctrine also which affirms that every truth and every action imply both an environment and a human subjectivity."

Sartre holds that man alone possesses existence. Because to be an existent proper, one is required to be conscious of one's own existence. Man consciously lives here. The point of Sartre is that man first of all exists and then only his essences come out. Sartre does not use the term human nature rather he uses the term 'human condition'. This term does not indicate any underlying essence within man. By essence Sartre means 'what has been'. Sartre calls it 'man's past'. Man creates his essence as he lives. The process of creating essence is a continuous process, and man is therefore not a well-articulated finished product.

3.6 Man and Freedom

Existentialism of Sartre is humanistic. Human freedom occupies the control place in his existentialism. Sartre aims at a complete freedom of human conscious from conceptual, empirical, theological consciousness. Human existence turns out to be what men freely choose to be and is not grounded on essence. Man is endowed with. Absolute Freedom. The very fact of free choice involves the inner feeling of responsibility. Man can choose what is better for himself and the whole world. Man is responsible for what he does, though he is not responsible for coming into the world. To quote Heidegger- 'Man is thrown into the world.' Sartre holds- 'Man is doomed to be free'. For him there is no value external to man. Values are created by man and have no objective or permanent basis. Man is recognizer of values and also the bearer of value.

3.7 Being and Nothingness

According to Sartre. Being has two aspect- consciousness and Matter. The consciousness is ephemeral and fickle. It has no permanency. On the other hand, matter is full, solid and impenetrable. Consciousness is mere possibility whereas matter is actuality. Thus Being possesses duality. Being in the form of pour-soi and-Being in the form of En- soi. In its pour-Soi aspect, the being is for-itself and is therefore unstable. In its En-Soi aspect, Being is in itself and is there stable. The pour-Sai (Being for itself) is roughly equivalent to consciousness and En-Soi

(Being in- itself) is roughly equivalent to matter. Being in- Itself can exist by itself, but. Being for-itself cannot do exist but depends upon the En-Soi or. Being in-itself. Apart from being in-itself and-being for itself there is the being for others. Thus Sartre draws attention to the three modes of Being, Yet he is primarily concerned with-being for-itself and Being in itself. The conscious subject is referred to as the Being for itself, because it exists for itself in every act of self-reflective consciousness. Sartre points out that consciousness is uncaused. Because consciousness has no essence, therefore it is nothingness that distinguishes consciousness from objects. Thus human existence is characterized by nothingness and negativity. Being for-itself is different from Being in-itself. But all the times withing human reality there is a continuous attempt to combine being in-itself and Being-for-itself. The ideal combination of Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself would remain unrealized and unrealizable. As a result human consciousness continues to remain as unhappy consciousness.

Stop to Consider:

Thus Sartre analyses human existence, in terms of the opposition of 'Being-in-itself' and 'Being for-itself', and the tension between the fact that man experiences 'facti city' and the capacity of transcending himself which constitute transcendence. Man is a complex of fact city and transcendence. Transcendence signifies possibility. Sartre holds- " 'Man is what he is not' not what he is"- this refer to a playful paradox which refers to the fact that man is always in the process of transcending himself. Man's consciousness makes the contents meaningful. Otherwise contents have no meaning. Consciousness intends, but in itself it is nothing. Consciousness is always the consciousness of an object.

According to Sartre man is not a substance; indeed, he is different from all kinds of substances. That is why he rejects Descartes dictum 'cogito ergo sum' as invalid. It is not the case that 'I think therefore I am', on the contrary I am not therefore I think. Thus Being cannot be realized through thinking; thinking indicates Nothingness. Being is a matter of existential realization. It is not attained through objectivity; but through subjectivity. Sartre also rejects {latonic dictum 'essence precedes existence'. In Platonic idealism individual human existence has not been given due importance. According to Plato essences are primary and particular concrete things are mere copies of these essence. Plato believes that other has no quality except otherness. According to Sartre, Plato fails to appreciate that even otherness is a forum of consciousness. He believes that otherness and nothingness are the same and these belong to Being. Sartre gives importance on every individual being.

Check Your Progress:

Write a note on Existentialism. (within 60 words)

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.....
.....

3.8 Atheism

Sartre’s existentialism is atheistic. The basic ontological premise of Sartre’s existentialism is negative and atheistic. According to Sartre the conception of god is self-contradictory. The existence of god is not necessary for the existence and freedom of finite personalities. Sartre reject the traditional conception of god as almighty, omnipotent, omniscient Being. He is therefore said to be an atheist. However, inspite of his disbelief in god, Sartre is not an irreligious person. He only reject the intellectual conception of god. According to Sartre, god is not an Absolute Being. Sratre maintains that man is utterly free and fully responsible. There is no force which can determine or limit him. If a man feels responsible and free, there is no need, no place, for god in his life. Sartre examines the various arguments about god and concludes that it is illogical to believe that god is necessary for the creation of the world. If god creates world, who creates Him. If he is responsible for his own creation, there has to be a division of god as the god the creator and the created god. All this goes to show that god is unnecessary. Thus in Sartre’s existentialism we find a detailed treatment of the significance of human existence. His existentialism is highly influential But many thinkers point out certain drawbacks of his philosophy.

3.9 Criticism

About human relations Sartre has given a very pessimistic picture. He thinks that all human relations are based on conflict. Man is first an object to the other human being. Man wants to conquer his own subjectivity by making the other his object. The endless struggle continues and man can never establish relations of love and friendliness with others. If this is the true picture of human relations, then it is strange how Sartre can also say that man, by choosing of himself, also decides for the whole of mankind. His individualistic ideas are to deep in his mind to give him the idea of a world., where all men will have freedom, equality and social will being. Many thinkers have pointed out that there is a contradiction in Sartre’s philosophy. Sratre is very much concerned about the welfare of the individual, but at the same time he feels that individual man can establish his progress and

welfare without those of the society. Sartre has not been successful in reconciling the individual and the society in his thought.

It may be pointed out that Sartre in his assertion of absolute freedom has neglected the truth of the theory of evolution that man has reached consciousness through the modification of his brain. Sartre has come to a different conclusion with the phenomenological method. Consciousness is not only account of man. Man has a body and this body obeys the rules of consciousness itself is not free from the rules. Sartre has not taken into account of this aspect of human reality.

Check Your Progress:

1. What is existentialism?
2. Discuss the nature of existentialism of Sartre?
3. How does being for itself differ from Being in itself according to Sartre?

Fill up the blanks:

1. Existentialism holds precedes
2. Sartre is an existentialist Philosopher.

3.10 Summing Up

Lean Paul Sartre is one of the most important philosopher of existentialism in modern times. He proclaimed the freedom of man to be absolute and wanted to establish that 'existence precedes essence'. His philosophy deals with the total aspect of human life, with an enquiry into the. Ontology of man's being, mans ethical reality, social and political life to determine the authentic nature of human existence.

3.11 Refferences/Suggested Readings

Existentialism and Humanism- J.P. Sartre.

Chief Current of contemporary Philosophy- D. M. Dutta

Principles of Philosophy- H.M. Bhattacharjya.

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Second Half

Unit: 1

RUSSELL

Contents:

- 1.1 Introduction**
- 1.2 Objectives**
- 1.3 Necessity of the Application of the Scientific Method in Philosophy**
- 1.4 Necessity of a Logically Perfect Language**
- 1.5 Importance of Logical Analysis**
- 1.6 Some Difficulties in Russell's Analytic Method**
- 1.7 Summing Up**
- 1.8 References/Suggested Readings**

1.1 Introduction

Bertrand Russell was born in England in 1872 and educated at Trinity College, Cambridge. After Cambridge he served briefly with the British Embassy in Paris and then went to Germany to study political theories. He traveled extensively and has lectured at many universities in the United States and elsewhere. He has been an extremely prolific writer and is recognized as one of the world's great philosophers and mathematicians. Of his many publications the following may be cited: *The Philosophy of Leibniz* (1900); *Principles of Mathematics* (1903); with Whitehead *Principia Mathematica* (1910); *Mysticism and Logic* (1918); *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1919); *Analysis of Matter* (1927); *Conquest of Happiness* (1932); *History of Western Philosophy* (1946);

There is a certain ambivalence and diversity of interests that make it difficult to categorize the philosophy of Bertrand Russell. There are marked differences between his earlier attitudes in philosophy and his more recent reflections. His early philosophy is more optimistic about the aims of philosophy, and the possibilities of man attaining certain knowledge. His later philosophy is more empirical than the earlier, closer to Hume and inclined to the view that "all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact or partial."

Although Russell is influenced by both Berkeley and Hume, Russell is never the complete empiricist perhaps this is because of his conviction that philosophy must begin with the analysis of propositions, that a sound philosophy must be logical in character, that logic is the very essence of philosophy. Further more his account of mathematical knowledge and the principle of induction led him to the consideration that there are types of knowledge that escaped the empirical net. His faith in science, and his delight in the problems of linguistic analysis is enthusiastic. It is just because of this diversity of interest and approaches to the problems of philosophy and his considerable influence upon so many of diverging trends in contemporary philosophy he is characterised as the true generous.

1.2 Objective

Russell holds that if we can succeed in understanding beliefs we should find that they are after all, intellectually satisfying; and this understanding can be reached only by analysis. If we want to understand thought we must examine language, since it is in language that thought finds its expression. This common assumption led him to think that the proper study of philosophy is logic. After reading this unit you will be able to

- *understand* why logic is essential to philosophy according to Russell
- *analyze* the necessity of the scientific method in philosophy.
- *know* the difficulties of the method of logical analysis.

1.3 Necessity to apply Scientific Method in Philosophy

Russell said that it is necessary to apply scientific method in philosophy so that philosophical truth can be as certain as science like mathematics. The results achieved by the philosophers should be impersonal and objective. Much of traditional philosophy fails to meet this standard. Traditional philosophy is merely grounded in intuition, and it is distorted by the hopes, fears and values of the investigators. It is important to recognise that 'insight', untested and unsupported, is an insufficient guarantee of truth.

The appropriateness of scientific method for philosophy reflects the fact that philosophy really is a form of science. The construction of philosophical theories is same as the construction of scientific one. Both aims at the development of theories with the maximum explanatory power using the maximum assumptions and theoretical concepts.

But philosophy is distinct from the special sciences. Philosophy consists of propositions that are distinguished from those of the special sciences by their

generality. It is governed by the ideal of axiomatic systematization. In *Our Knowledge of the External World*, 1918 Russell finds that the only beliefs which can not be easily doubted are those in our own perceptual experience. But ordinary common-sense views of perceptual knowledge are that there are objects independent of ourselves which we perceive by means of our sense-organs, This leads Russell to believe that the material we use in perceptual knowledge is not knowledge of physical objects, but individual perceptions.

At the time of *Our Knowledge Of the External World* Russell maintained an epistemology that our perceptual knowledge has for its basic material individual perceptions. The problem with common-sense perception, Russell believes, is then to find on what grounds the inference from our individual perception to permanent material things can be validated (justified).

Russell recognized 'material objects' or physics to be nothing but a series of actual and possible sense data. He said, "I think it may be laid down that, in so far as physics or common-sense is verifiable it must be capable of interpretation in terms of actual sense data alone. The reason for this is simple verification always consists in the occurrence of an expected sense datum. Astronomers tell us there will be an eclipse of the moon: We look at the moon, and find the earth's shadow biting in to it, that is to say, we see an appearance quite different from that of the usual full moon. Now if an expected sense datum constitutes verification, what was asserted must have been about sense data.

Therefore Russell feels that it is necessary to make it possible for philosophy to secure answers to possibly small problems and answers should be well grounded so that on the basis of such answers philosophy can proceed to larger generalizations. It is such faith which Russell presumably feels that he is illustrating in his works. Thus he calls his philosophy 'scientific' in the general sense of the word, that it is a cumulative process, finding definite answers to specialized questions, and only on the basis attempting to generalize.

His own philosophy, Russell feels, is also 'scientific' in a further sense. It uses a specialized tool that has been recently developed to arrive at answers for problems that tool is mathematical logic. It is mathematical logic that aids Russell in his analysis of mathematics, of descriptions, and in the formation of construction generally. It is this logic which also suggests possibilities in the analysis of many other problems. The importance of logic, the importance of the new philosophic method, are subjects that Russell often discusses. He speaks of logical analytic method in philosophy, to characterise logic as the essence of philosophy. He also develops the philosophy of logical atomism and in his later works emphasizes the importance of logical analysis.

In his essay entitled 'Logic as the essence of philosophy' in 1914, Russell said that philosophers should give an account of the world of science and daily life. but many philosophers proved to be incapable of giving any such account because they were less anxious to understand the world of science and daily life than to convict it of unreality in the interests of a supra-sensible real world. For Russell, if we can succeed in understanding the way we talk and think about the ordinary world, we shall not be led to reject it in favour of another world behind it. If we succeed in understanding our everyday beliefs we should find that they are after all, intellectually satisfying; and this understanding can be reached only by analysis.

Russell and Bradley assumed that if we want to understand thought we must understand language, since it is in language that thought finds its expression. This common assumption naturally led them both to think that the proper study of philosophers is logic.

1.4 Necessity of a Logically Perfect Language

Bertrand Russell in his book "The External World" first published in 1914, held that the subject matter of philosophy is language and the method of philosophy is analysis. He said, every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to necessary analysis and purification, it is found either to be found not really philosophical at all or logical. Both Frege and Russell displayed an univocal attitude to natural language. Though language is a means of communication of our thought, it is useful in countless way for the daily tasks which it fulfils. But it is endlessly misleading. Hence it is the business of the logician, to conduct a ceaseless struggle against the parts of language and grammar. The logician must try to liberate us from the fetters of language, to break the power of the word over the human mind. Therefore the logician is to investigate thought, not sentences; to discover the laws of thought, not of sentences.

It can not be the task of logic to investigate language and determine what is contained in a linguistic expression. The logician investigates the laws of logic, and these do not bear the relation to thought that the laws of grammar bear to language. As a vehicle for the expression of thought, language must model itself upon what happens at the level of thought. So we may hope that we can use it as a bridge from the perceptible to the imperceptible (thought). Once we have a linguistic understanding about what happens, we may find it easier to go on and apply what we have understood to what is mirrored in language. But the use of language requires caution. We should not overlook the deep gulf that separates the level of language from that of thought, and which imposes certain limits on the

mutual correspondence of the two levels. The remedy for these defects is the invention of logically perfect language.

In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by combination of words. a language of that sort will be completely analytic and will show at a glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied. Actual languages are not logically perfect in this sense and they can not possibly be, if they are to serve the purposes of daily life. Both Russell and Frege thought that natural languages are logically defective that ordinary grammar was a fallible guide to the real structures which in their view logic and philosophy must investigate, and that the new logic provided a logically ideal language for the purposes of philosophy.

Stop to consider:

1. Russell's Analytic method is influenced by his interest in math and mathematical logic. The use of an artificial language, the concept of an ideal language, or a logically perfect language, is the central and common target of many contemporary critics of Russell.
2. This conception of an 'ideal language' assumes that common language is in some way inferior and that it ought to be reformed and corrected according to the standards of regularity, of precision or explicitness of mathematical logic.
3. But ordinary natural language is itself the standard by which philosophical discourse is to be judged and by which philosophical conclusions are to be tested.
4. The imposition of the model of the perfect language, oversimplifies and misinterprets the proper meanings and the proper logic of the ordinary discourse.

Check Your Progress:

1. Why did Russell think that traditional philosophy is not able to give us certain knowledge?
2. How can we make philosophy scientific according to Russell?
3. What is the necessity of a logically perfect language?

In his essay 'On scientific Method in philosophy', Russell announced the advent of a new method in philosophy. This method was said to be as revolutionary as the work of Galileo had been to modern science. It made philosophy capable of producing results as definite, verifiable, indisputable as those of science, of either deciding eternal disputes of philosophy, or showing that no decision could be reached.

Two Main and Important Aspects of Regarding Logic as Essential :

The new method in philosophy owed its origin to mathematical logic. With respect to the philosophical importance of the foundations of logic, Russell's analysis describes two aspects of logic as essential.

The first part investigates what propositions are and what forms they may have. This part enumerates the different kinds of atomic propositions of molecular proposition of general propositions, and so on. This part merely enumerates forms, is the more difficult, and philosophically the more important; and it is the recent progress in this first part, more than anything else, that has rendered a truly scientific discussion of many philosophical problems possible.

The second part consists of certain supremely general propositions, which asserts the truth of all propositions of certain forms. This part merges in to pure mathematics, whose proposition on analysis, turn out to be general formal truths. Therefore logical analysis is important in this part.

1.5 Importance of Logical Analysis

The logical analytic method which Russell proclaimed as the method of scientific philosophising, was both formal and empirical in using the distinctions developed in this formal analysis to analyse empirical propositions and empirical concepts. This method both a-priori and verifiable. This method is analytic and constructive. Analytic in its method of reducing complexes to units, constructive in ressembling these units according to logical pattern and with a synthesizing intent.

There were important changes in Russell's concept of the relation of philosophy to science and to logic as his thought developed. He came to see mathematical logic as a subject in itself which had philosophical aspects and mathematical aspects but was a definite, scientifically progressive discipline.

Russell thinks that philosophy can be scientific if we apply the standard of mathematical logic. Russell regards that the relation between science and philosophy like the relation the conclusions of science and the data of perception as a vital philosophical problem. Both the data of perception and the conclusions of science are not to be questioned, but the philosophers's job is to build a bridge between them. In all of Russell's work in the theory of knowledge, there is an effort to build that bridge. For him the result of science have contributed an important set of data. Physics, psychology, and the other sciences are taken to be for the most part true, and whatever the picture we construct of the world and of the way we know the world, it must rely on and be consistent with these results. For this reason Russell continuously modified his own work when new scientific theories seemed to require it And perhaps for this reason, he criticised

contemporary oxford philosophy for failing to recognise the importance of scientific knowledge for sound philosophizing.

Philosophy, is neither identical with logic nor with science, but it has common grounds with both. Logic provides philosophy with a model of exact reasoning and careful analysis, and the tools and special techniques which were developed as part of logic itself. Science provides philosophy with the data of its inquiries, and the model of reliable knowledge. Philosophy attempts to provide a theoretical analysis which will justify the results of sciences and suggestions which may become the hypothesis of the special sciences.

SAQ:

Discuss Logic as the essence of philosophy. Explain within 100 words.

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.....
.....
.....

The aim of Russell’s theory of logical construction was to search for an indubitable datum. We may be mistaken in our perception of tables and chairs, due to illusions and hallucinations, but we can not be mistaken with regard to sensible element or a sense datum which is an object of direct awareness Russell call the sense data the facts of sense or the “hard data”. Russell assumed that there are really tables and chairs in the world. For Russell, the problem of the nature of external objects like tables and chairs is a problem of justifying an inference from the perception of sense data to physical objects. We directly perceive only the sense data and from them, we pass on to the inference of physical objects. This can not justified logically. The inference from the sense data to physical object is only probable and never certain.

Stop to Consider:

Rueeell’s theory of judgment and his account of empirical knowledge in general is egocentric For this reason Wittgenstein criticised Russell’s view of emperical knowledge and judgment. A subject can be acquainted with particulars, i.e. sense data, in sensation and with facts in perception. Perception is distinguished from sensation. Perception requires not only acquaintance with particulars but also acquaintance with universals. An object of perception can never be a particular but always expressed by a true proposition. Perception is incorrigible, but in different way from that in which sensation

is incorrigible. Perception yields knowledge of truths where as acquaintance with particulars in sensation does not. The verbal expression of a perception involves the use of logically proper names and atleast one world standing for a universal. Therefore the object of knowledge in perception always has propositional form and can never be simply named.

If perception is incorrigible, one can ask the question, how is false judgment possible? For Russell falsity only becomes possible with a judgment that is not merely analytic of is given in present experience but goes beyond to things more or less remote in space and time. The particulars of such judgment can not be the logical subject of the proposition, since they are not objects of acquaintance.

We may have “Man is mortal” as an example of general proposition. Here “man” refers to each individual man indirectly through the property of being human. Hence its significance does not depend upon the acquaintance with each individual man. We may acquainted with this or that man, but as such can be known to us only by description. Thus the object for which man stands is a logical construction. Similarly when we say, ‘This table is brown’. There is a reference to each member of the class of the appearance of the table, although we are acquainted with only one appearance of the table. This is called by Russell as a “sense datum”. Hence, the table can not be an object of direct apprehension; it is an incomplete symbol which stands for an object which can only be a logical construction.

For Russell acquaintance with particulars in sensation provides the subject with an immediate cognitive contact with the particular constituents of the physical world and hence perception of facts is not only the ultimate source of verification for the subjects of empirical knowledge but also the foundation of his capacity to denote unambiguously, e.g. by means of ordinary proper names and definite descriptions, things in space and time beyond his perception of facts.

But for Wittgenstein, a proposition is the perceptible expression of a thought and hence it is not independent of thought. A proposition relating to the world is not explained in terms of some subject’s capacity to think about things in the world or to perceive things in the world.

Because Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of an account of perception in terms of an immediate cognitive relation between unique subject in the spatio-temporal series and particular objects and an account of conception as a relation in time between a subject and a subsistent universal. And any attempt to explain the nature of the relation between a name and an object in terms of an immediate experiential relation between some unique subject and an object of his experience.

1.6 Some Difficulties in Russell's Analytic Method

Russell speaks of the logical analytic method in philosophy to characterise logic as the essence of philosophy. For this he develops the philosophy of 'logical atomism' and in his later works emphasizes the importance of 'logical analysis'.

1. But Logical Atomism Inevitably Leads to Solipsism:

We have seen that the atomic propositions from which all others are derived as truth functions of them. They may contain only logically proper names apart from names and relations. The constituents of logically proper names are facts depicted and not descriptions. A logically proper name can be given only to object of acquaintance. The only particular objects of acquaintance are sense data. But sense data are essentially private to the person who has them and hence it follows that no two people can ever both be acquainted with the same object.

2. Some Confusions May Arise Regarding the Concept of an Atomic Proposition:

Because, the atomists contained that an atomic proposition consists of only logically proper names of particulars. But they had been very reluctant to attempt to give an example of one.

3. Russell has Confused the Standard Meaning of a Statement with Reference Meaning of a Sentence:

The logical forms used by mathematical logic are necessarily standardized and necessarily impose a standard which is free from logical ambiguities. Such ambiguities are part of ordinary speech. In stressing 'entailment rules' in logical analysis, mathematical logicians disregard other rules which are an important part of the meaning of sentences. These other rules connection the specific uses of sentences in specific contexts are, or ought to be, of central importance to logic. The 'ideal sentence' confuses sentences with statements.

Russell's analytic method is an example of the errors of "logical atomism". This analysis is said to be metaphysically oriented in atomism, since the belief in irreducible facts at which analysis ends, is the real motive and foundation for the method of analysis.

4. Reductive Analysis not Possible:

Russell's analytic method includes his logical and mathematical researches. Russell said, it is 'a kind of logical doctrine which seems to me to result from

the philosophy of mathematics'. After his successful application of the analytic method in the sphere of mathematics, Russell wanted to apply this method in other spheres also.

But there are a number of difficulties in giving an analysis in terms of sense data. There is the difficulty of specifying sense data expected in terms of physical objects. We can not get a finite set of hypothetical statements about sense data which is a necessary condition of the truth of a physical object. Since there is not a finite set of hypotheticals about sense data as sufficient

Check Your Progress:

1. Is atomic proposition possible?
2. What are the defects of reductive analysis?

1.7 Summing Up

This unit has helped you to understand why logic is essential to philosophy. For Russell the centre of gravity of philosophy lies within epistemology. The problem of philosophy is discovering and formulating the foundations of knowledge; i.e. the presentation of an axiomatic systematization of what can be known with certainty and a calculation of the degree of probability which is attached to the propositions that can not be regarded as conclusively true.

But this primacy of epistemology is easily overlooked. Because of Russell's insistence on the importance of logic to philosophy. In his view, logic is important as a means not as an end in itself. The correct account of the logical forms of propositions is necessary for identifying errors in traditional metaphysics and epistemology. They are indispensable as tools in the search for the foundations of knowledge. The importance of logic, the importance of the new philosophic method, are subjects that Russell often discusses. He develops the philosophy of 'Logical atomism' and in his later works emphasizes the importance of logical analysis. But there are some serious defects in Russell's analytic method. This unit has given an account of the defects of the analytic method. Where Russell's kind of analytic philosophy of empiricism is acceptable or not as a modern theory of knowledge, it is clear that we are greatly in his debt for painstaking and honest analysis by which the limitations of the Humean tradition of empiricism are revealed.

1.8 References/Suggested Readings

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Unit: 2

MOORE

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2.1 Introduction

The name of George Edward Moore (1873-1958) is well-known in the history of philosophy. His lasting influence in technical philosophical thought is beyond question. He has been one of the most important leaders of the modern philosophical movement known as “Philosophical Realism”. In philosophy his reputation rests on the ‘appeal to commonsense’, by which he drew a contrast between his puzzlement and doubts about the truth and meaning of what philosophers say, and his clarity and certainty as to what, as non-philosophers, most of us commonly and ordinarily mean and believe. Apart from his argumentation for common-sense philosophy, he is also renowned for his ethical view called ethical non-naturalism. In his Meta ethical writings mainly in his “Principia Ethica”, he rejects ethical naturalism and takes the fundamental moral properties to be non-natural i.e., they are incapable of definition in terms of natural properties. In this unit, however, attempt has been made only to analyse Moore’s metaphysical and Epistemological views and thereby to enable you understand Moore’s basic philosophical contention while refuting idealism.

2.2 Objectives

After reading this unit you will be able to

- *examine* Moore’s argument regarding refutation of Idealism.
- *understand* Moore’s critical differentiation between sensation and existence of the object of sensation

- *discuss* Moore's analysis of sense-data and consciousness, their relations and distinctions.
- *analyse* Moore's expositions regarding what is mind and what is acts of consciousness.

2.3 Refutation of Idealism

The dominant feature of his philosophy is his defence of common sense. And as such he refuted Idealism, which he believed, went against common sense. The article, entitled "The Refutation of Idealism" at first appeared in "Mind" in 1903. This article again was contained in "Philosophical Studies", published in 1922. Dr. Rudoly Metz, the historian of British philosophy, maintained that from this essay is usually dated the beginning of the new realistic movement. It is true that in the preface to his "philosophical studies". Moore said regarding this essay that— "This paper now appears to me to be wholly confused, as well as to embody a good many down right mistakes". But since he did not repudiate the article as a whole, it seems that though he had diverged widely from the views expressed there, he agreed with the main contentions of the article. And there lies the importance of the essay "The Refutation of Idealism".

This article mainly reflects the epistemological aspect of Moore's philosophy. Moore says in this essay that the Modern Idealism, if it asserts any general conclusion about the universe at all, asserts that it is spiritual. He calls attention to two points about this assertion –

- that the universe is very different from what it seems, and
- that it has quite a large number of properties which it does not seem to have.

External things like chairs, tables, mountains etc. seem to be very different from us. But when the whole universe is declared to be spiritual, then one has to admit that the external things are much more like us than we think. The idealists say that these things are, in some sense, neither lifeless nor unconscious, as they seem to be. And secondly, when the idealist declares that objects are spiritual, he means that it is not only in the same sense conscious, but it has higher forms of consciousness, which we have in ourselves. In short, it may be said that the whole universe possesses all the qualities, the possession of which is held to make us superior to things, which seem to be inanimate.

When we say that the universe is spiritual, we mean to say that it has quite a number of excellent qualities, different from any, which we commonly attribute either to stars or planets or to cups and saucers.

Moore says that when engaged in the intricacies of philosophical problems, we are apt to overlook the vastness of the difference between this idealistic view and the ordinary view of the world, and to overlook the number of different propositions which the idealists must prove. Moore says that owing to the vastness of this difference and owing to the number of different excellencies, which the idealists attribute to the universe, it seems an important question - whether Idealism is true or not. For Moore "Idealism" is a wide term and it includes not only the conclusion that reality is spiritual, but a number of arguments which are supposed to be necessary to prove it. Many theologians also believe reality to be spiritual, but for believing that alone, they can not be termed as Idealists. Therefore, Moore is concerned only with idealistic arguments. If any idealist holds that no argument is necessary to prove that reality is spiritual. Moore does not intend to refute him. But he intends to attack at least one argument, which is considered necessary to their position by all idealists. And he believes that if his arguments are sound, they would refute Idealism. He thinks that if he can refute a single proposition which is a necessary and essential step in all idealistic arguments then no matter how good the rest of those arguments may be, he shall have proved that the Idealists have no reason what for their conclusion.

In "The Refutation of Idealism" Moore discusses the question whether physical objects can exist independently of mind or not. But in this article he is not trying to refute the idealistic view as such, but only the subjectivist theory of knowledge, propounded by Berkeley. He mainly discusses Berkeley's famous proposition "Esse is percipi", which Moore considers to be the basic proposition of Idealism.

In "The Refutation of Idealism" we find an account of what Moore means by consciousness. In dealing with a sensation or an idea. Moore tries to find out what they actually mean. He says that the sensation of blue differs from the sensation of green, yet both of them are sensations. He says that both of them have something in common, which he calls "consciousness", and something else, in respect of which they differ, which he calls the 'object' of sensation. So in every sensation there are two elements 'consciousness' and 'object of consciousness'. Moore believes that sensations are alike by virtue of the fact that they have different objects. The question arises, he says, whether, when the sensation of blue exists, it is the consciousness which exists, or blue which exists, or both. One point atleast is plain that these three alternatives are different from one another. So that if anyone tells us that to say "blue exists" is the same thing to say that blue and consciousness exist, he makes a mistake, a contradictory mistake".

2.4 Sensation & Object of Sensation

But another point is also plain, according to Moore namely that when the sensation exists) consciousness certainly does exist; because when we say that the sensation

of blue and the sensation of green both exist, we mean that what is common to them both, exists in both cases. The alternative left.

Moore thinks, is that either both exist or consciousness exists alone. "If, therefore, anyone tells us that the existence of blue is the same thing as the existence of the sensation of blue, he makes a mistake, and a self-contradictory mistake, for he asserts either that blue is the same thing as the blue together with consciousness or that it is the same thing as consciousness alone". So, according to Moore, to identify blue or any other of what he called "objects" of sensation, with the corresponding sensation, is in every case a self-contradictory error. He thinks that it is to identify a part either with the whole or with the other part of the same whole. Moore says that if we are told that the assertion "Blue exists" is meaningless unless it means that "the sensation of the blue exists", then we are told something which is both false and self-contradictory. He maintains that if again we are told that the existence of blue is inconceivable apart from the existence of the sensation of blue, then also we are told something self-contradictory. Because, Moore says, that we must conceive the existence of blue as something quite distinct from the existence of the sensation of blue. He thinks that we must conceive that blue might exist, and yet the sensation of blue may not. Moore says that he not only conceives it, but conceives it to be true. So he believes that the assertion, that the existence of blue is inconceivable apart from the existence of the sensation of blue, implies what is false and self-contradictory.

Moore is of opinion that no philosopher has ever yet succeeded in avoiding this self-contradictory error. He says that 'esse' is identified with 'percipi', because what is experienced is identified with the experience of it. To prove the plausibility of his theory. Moore offers two pieces of evidence. "The first is that language offers us no means of referring to such objects as 'blue', and 'green', and 'sweet', except by calling them sensations, it is an obvious violation of language to call them 'things' or 'objects' of 'terms'. And similarly we have no natural means of referring to such objects as 'causality', or 'likeness', or 'identity' except by calling them 'ideas' or 'notions' or 'conceptions'. Moore believes that if the philosophers in the past had clearly distinguished in the past between a sensation or an idea and what he had called its object, then it is likely that there would have been a separate name for the latter. He says that 'they have always used the same name for these two different things (if! May call them so); and hence there is some probability that they have supposed these 'things' not to be two and different, but one and the same".

So far Moore has established that in every sensation we have to distinguish two elements :

(1) the object or that in regard to which sensations differ from one another,
and

(2) consciousness or that which they have in common.

Now it follows, Moore says, that we have to choose between the alternatives, that either consciousness alone or object alone exists or both exist in a sensation. He says that we can exclude the alternatives that “object alone exists” by the fact that what we mean to assert is certainly the existence of a mental act. So now the question remains, according to Moore, “Does existence alone exist?” or “Do both exist?” He says that the answer generally given is that both exist.

If we consider what we have of Moore’s philosophy so far, we find that in this article Moore’s analysis of consciousness has taken an extremely crude form. He seems to think that every thing in the universe consists of different parts. In the sensation of green he finds two distinct elements: one is “consciousness” and the other is ‘object’ of consciousness, consciousness, always refers to something; it is always “consciousness of something” the idealists seem to be right in insisting that it is the very nature of consciousness to point beyond it self. Moore denies this intrinsic quality of consciousness, we can never imagine a state of consciousness which is not of anything else. The division of a simple fact like “sensation of blue” into two distinct elements, “Consciousness” and “object” seems to be objectionable. Therefore, we find that Moore has not been able to give an adequate description of consciousness. Next Moore considers the idealistic statement regarding the relation of object to consciousness, which holds that object is merely the content of a sensation or idea. It has been suggested by the idealist that in every sensation we can distinguish two elements:

(1) the fact that there is experience, and (2) what is felt or experienced. They believe that a sensation or an idea forms a whole, in which we distinguish two “inseparable elements”, : ‘content’ and ‘existence’. He raises the question: what is meant by saying that one thing is the content of another?”

First of all, he admits that it is correct to say that blue is a part of the content of a blue flower. Moore says that if we again say that it is a part of the content of the sensation of blue, we assert that “it has to the other parts of this whole the same relation which it has to the other parts of a blue flower and we assert only this: we cannot mean to assert that it has to the sensation of blue any relation which it does not have to the blue flower”. He says that we have seen that a sensation of blue contains atleast one other elements beside blue, namely, what he calls consciousness. So Moore says that if we assert that blue is the content of the sensation of blue, we assert that it has to this consciousness the same relation which it has to the other parts of a blue flower.

Moore maintains that the 'content' of the thing is 'what' we assert to exist when we assert 'that' the thing exists. "When, therefore, blue is said to be part of the content of the 'sensation of blue', the latter is treated as if it were a whole constituted in exactly the same way in which the two latter differ from one another; the blue bead differs from the blue beard, in that the while former contains glass, the latter contains hair; and the sensation of blue differs from both in that, instead of glass or hair, it contains consciousness. The relation of the blue to the consciousness is conceived to be exactly the same as that of the blue to the glass or hair; it is in all three cases the 'quality' of a 'thing'.

From this paragraph also we can understand clearly how Moore thought that we can distinguish separate distinct elements in the universe. Moore thinks that 'blue' is the quality of 'bead' or 'bead'. These two elements, namely 'blue' and 'bead' or 'beard' is not one entity with him, but two entities: 'blue' and 'glass'. And he seems to treat colour as a part of the thing. Again, when 'blue' is said to be the content of the 'sensation of 'blue', Moore thinks that 'blue' is a part of the blue flower. But as we have said before, it is wrong to imagine some distinct elements in a thing.

2.5 Sense-Data & Consciousness

Moore says that to say that a sensation exists is to say that both blue exists and consciousness exists too. He maintains that a sensation is "being aware of" something. When we know that a sensation of blue exists, we know that there exists an awareness of blue, according to Moore. "And this awareness is not merely, as we have neither to seen it must be, itself something unique and distinct, utterly different from blue; it also has a perfectly unique and distinct relation to blue. This relation is just that, which we mean in every case by knowing. To be aware of the sensation of blue is 'not' to be aware of mental image. It is to be aware of an awareness of blue". Moore says that this elements is neglected by the content theory; this theory fails to express the fact that there is, in the sensation of blue, this unique relation between 'blue' and the other constituent. Moore thinks that this commission is due to the fact that though philosophers have recognised that something distinct is meant by consciousness, they have never yet had a clear conception of what it is. Moore maintains that the philosophers have not been able to hold it before their minds compare it with blue, as they can compare blue and green. This, Moore explains, is due to the fact that the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what it is, it seems to vanish. "When we try to

introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue; the other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it can be distinguished if we look alternatively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for”.

Moore says that since the sensation of blue includes in the analysis, besides blue, both a unique element of “awareness” and “a unique relation of their element to blue”, now he can make plain what he meant by asserting that (1) blue is probably not part of the content of the sensation of blue; and even if were, (2) the sensation would not be the sensation of blue, if blue had only relation to it.

Moore says that the first hypothesis may be expressed by saying that, if it were true, -then when the sensation of blue exists, there exists a blue awareness. And he finds no reason to suppose that our awareness is blue introspection, he says, does not enable us to decide with certainty whether our awareness is blue or not. But he says that introspection does enable us to decide certainty that, “I am aware of blue-and by this mean, that my awareness to blue a quite different and distinct relation. It is possible, admit, that my awareness is blue as well as being of blue; but what I am quite sure is that it is of blue; that it has to blue the simple and unique relation the existence of which alone justifies us in distinguishing knowledge of a thing from the thing known, indeed distinguishing mind from matter. And this result may express by saying that what is called the ‘content’ of a sensation is in very truth what finally called it — the sensation’s object”.

From this account it can be seen that in “The Refutation of Idealism” Moore gives us a very bad analysis of the notion of consciousness. But even then this article is profoundly important because of its stress of the fact that for a state of mind to be of objects is something quite unique and not adequately express by supposing the state of mind to have the qualities of objects as parts, neither of which would entail that there was consciousness of any objects.

2.6 Mind and Consciousness

Moore’s views on consciousness and mind can be found in some of the lectures which he delivered in 1909 - 10, which have been comprised in his book “Some Main Problems of Philosophy”. There in the first chapter, entitled “what is philosophy?” he discusses his views on mind and consciousness. He says that in the universe there are material objects as well as minds. We human beings possess bodies as well as minds. By saying we have minds, he means that we perform certain acts of consciousness. “That is to say we see and hear and feel and remember and imagine and think and believe and desire and like and dislike and will and love and are angry and afraid act. These things that we do are all of them mental acts - acts of mind or acts of consciousness; whenever we do any of them, we are conscious of something; each of them partly consists in our being

conscious of something in some way or other; and it seems to me that the thing of which we are most certain, when we say we are certain, is that we do these thing- and we perform these acts of consciousness”.

Moore says that we are sure that we do perform these mental acts and that these acts are very much different from material objects. He maintains that every one of us perform immense numbers of these mental acts every day and all day long, and that we cease to perform them only when sleeping, without dreaming.

Regarding the relation of material objects to acts of consciousness, Moore says that common sense believes that acts of consciousness are quite definitely not attached to some material objects and quite as definitely not attached to some others, Moore says that we believe that our acts of consciousness - the acts which we perform as long as we are alive are attached to our bodies, in the sense that they occur in the same place in which our bodies are. He says that we ordinarily believe in this way, though philosophers think that acts of consciousness do not occur in any place at all. According to them, acts of consciousness are not in space at all. But Moore says that we commonly do believe that our acts of consciousness occur ‘in place’ in which our bodies are at that moment. But this Moore does not mean that we have any idea as to exactly where in the bodies our acts of consciousness take place of he does not mean that some acts of consciousness take place in exactly the same place while others take place in different places. All he means to say is that they take place some where in our bodies. “We believe, at least, that immense number of acts of consciousness are attached, each of them, to some particular body, in the sense that they occur some where or other in that body. My acts of consciousness take place in my body, and yours take place in yours, and our minds (generally, at least) go with us, where ever our bodies go”.

So Moore thinks that many acts of consciousness are attached to particular material objects, in the sense that they take place where these objects are. But Moore does not mean that this is the only sense in which we believe them to be attached to particular objects. He says that we believe many of them to be dependent upon the changes which occur in our bodies. For example, we only see when certain changes take place in our eyes. This is another way, Moore says, in which our acts of consciousness are attached to particular bodies; but he thinks that the simplest and most universal relation which we believe to hold between acts of consciousness and particular bodies is that they occur where these bodies are.

Moore says that we believe that some acts of consciousness are attached to some material objects. But we also believe, he says, that to the vast majority of material objects, no acts of consciousness are attached to such objects. He thinks

that they are attached to the bodies of human beings and perhaps to those of animals; but not to chairs and tables etc. So he thinks that in the vast majority of cases no acts of consciousness-are attached. Moore says that we believe that we are conscious at certain times of something or other and we believe that these things continue to exist even when we do not think of them. So Moore says that material objects are completely independent of our acts of consciousness. In all these discussions we can see that it is common sense which Moore tries to defend; and he expresses his views in an ordinary manner. Sometimes he uses technical philosophical terms for an ordinary use. He discusses every minute point, and has brought to light many of the defects of modern Idealism and has founded common sense in a firm footing. Thus he has become one of the most important propounders of Neo- Realism.

2.7 Summing Up

After reading this unit you are now in a position to analyse and examine Moore's total philosophical contention in refuting idealism. The Refutation of Idealism, then, is an attempt to demonstrate the falsity of "to be is to be perceived." The formula asserts that if anything X is known to exist, the consequence immediately follows that it is perceived. Thus understood, "to be is to be perceived" is not a mere identity: if 'being perceived' follows from 'being', these two cannot be identical. Moore's basic intention of this refutation is the extension of sense-experience, to demonstrate the strong distinction between mind and its object which is encountered in connection with its meaning.

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Unit: 3

WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY

Contents:

- 3.1 Introduction**
- 3.2 Objectives**
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3.1 Introduction

Wittgenstein was a linguistic philosopher. Linguistic philosophy is much similar to positivism, from which it is developed. It would agree with positivism in their emphasis on analysis as against speculation; therefore philosophy is not a body of propositions but an activity; and the object of its analytic concern is language.

In the philosophy of language Wittgenstein is a dominant character. In the twentieth century philosophy of language Wittgenstein has occupied a central position because to a great extent he is successful in explaining most of the general features of language such as meaning, reference, truth verification, speech acts, logical necessity etc.

It is not an easy matter to answer the question who was Wittgenstein? Because Wittgenstein is still so close to us, still so much a figure of our own time that an objective and balanced appraisal is difficult to achieve. Posterity must determine his exact place in the history of philosophy; but at any rate there can be no doubt that he was a genius. Wittgenstein's work in philosophy was passionate, intense, inspired. He dedicated himself to it; philosophy was his life.

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein was born in 1889 in Vienna. After finishing his primary school he went to the secondary school. Among the subjects taught at this school was philosophy for which a text book was used that was written by a

pupil of the Austrian philosopher Meinong. Wittgenstein was in correspondence with Husserl, Russell and Moore. He investigated the relation between thought and reality from the point of view of the 'meanings' of words as used in language. In 1906 Wittgenstein finished at the secondary school and went to study engineering, initially in Berlin, later in Manchester. He came in to contact with the work of more scientifically and logically minded thinkers. During his period of study in England he spent many vacations on the continent, taking the opportunity to visit leading scholars like Gottlob Frege. It was Frege who aroused his interest in the philosophy of mathematics and logic and advised him to study under Bertrand Russell in Cambridge. Russell maintains that Wittgenstein's earlier work, with which he himself had much to do, remains of considerable value.

In 1929, Wittgenstein received his Ph. D. degree in June of the same year, submitting the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* as a thesis, and the following year he was made a Fellow of Trinity College. Around 1933 he began to circulate his new ideas in the form of two collections of lecture notes, the one in a blue folder, the other in a brown. They were published after his death as *The Blue and Brown Books*. He turns here to the study of ordinary language and instead of taking one use of language as ideal, the logical one, he begins to distinguish many uses. In 1953, *Philosophical Investigations* published. It is devoted largely to the study of ordinary language. In 1956, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* was published and concerned largely with artificial languages. The latter work, however, consists of notes which, in this form, Wittgenstein had not intended for publication.

3.2 Objectives

Wittgenstein holds the key to modern philosophical activities. And there is an obvious need for an exposition of his thought. After reading this unit you will be able to:

- *know* about the central teachings of the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*.
- *explain* facts and proposition
- *discuss* language-games and family resemblance.

3.3 Central ideas in the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigations*

The basic ideas of Wittgenstein's philosophy are to be found in the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. In the former, he is concerned with the logic of language and the function of philosophy. The problems of philosophy he insists

arise out of a misunderstanding of language. Philosophy he describes as therapeutic, since it cures philosophical difficulties by showing how they arise. In particular he shows we overlook the limits of language and attempt to render propositions that are meaningless meaningful.

The Investigations represents a considerable revision of Wittgenstein's earlier philosophy. The more general treatment of language in the Tractatus as a picture of reality is replaced with the notion of 'Language Game' in the Investigations, and with the important idea that the meaning of a term lies in its use, not in philosophical language but also in ordinary language. The Russellian notion that philosophy must correct ordinary language is rejected. Wittgenstein also rejected the notion of logical atomism and analytic theory of meaning and regarded that meaning must be equated with use.

According to Ryle, Wittgenstein's philosophy is really two fold In his earlier book Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, he developed a number of ideas including the view of logical truths as tautologies and of meaning as certain complex of words that distributed to the development of logical positivism. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein breaks with positivism in two important respects: he defines meaning as the rules for the employment of an expression; and related to this language is seen to have an indefinite variety of uses. Though both these works are different, the task of philosophy seen as meaning elucidation prevents us from falling in to philosophical questions and puzzlement.

The early Wittgenstein assumed that each proposition has one and only one final analysis because he believed that every proposition has a perfectly determinate or definite sense. For him the sense of a proposition is the situation it describes; and situation is something which either actually does or atleast might possibly is. So the sense of a proposition, being the situation it describes, must be perfectly definite.

The main view of the Tractatus was that language is a picture of reality this means that there must be similarity of structure between that which pictures and that which is pictured. The form of language must be the same as that of reality. Because the world is nothing but what our language expresses to us. The languages which do not follow the structure of logical form of reality it can not convey any meaning and will be nonsense. A meaningful statement is possible if it is in accordance with the structure of reality.

Wittgenstein came to realize that the view he offered in the Tractatus that meaning is equal to reference is not true because this view of meaning limits the function of language.

Wittgenstein had said in the Tractatus that, if we are to get at the meaning of any piece of language we must analyse it into elementary propositions which are logically independent of one another and consist of elements (names) which refer one for one to the simple(objects) of reality. He came to see that elementary propositions may be logically related to one another within systems and that in order to understand any single proposition, one must understand the whole system to which it belongs. Moreover he came to believe that the ultimate simpler or reality are not merely, the one for one correspondence of the elements of individual propositions but it has to exist in the systems of propositions which describes properties admitting of gradation or degrees, such as colour or length, can not be analysed in to simpler propositions so they are not elementary according to that criterion and since they can not exclude one another they are not elementary in the sense of being logically independent of one another.

Stop to consider:

1. Wittgenstein said in the Investigation that to speak of an absolute one- for -one correspondence between the simples of language and reality respectively makes no sense to us because to speak of breaking reality down absolutely in to its simple does not make any sense. When we are asked what simples of anything are, we must reply 'That depends on what you understand by 'composite'. but Wittgenstein said that this is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question. The attempt to get at the meaning of language by analysing it absolutely in to simples which correspond one for one with the simples of reality must necessarily fail. The notion of an absolutely determinate sense of proposition, is divorced from the actual give and take of human discourse and from all human activities.
2. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein severely criticised the idea of analysis. For him the analysing sentesce does not really mean the same like the first sentence to anyone who uttered sentence.
3. Wittgenstein came to think that the word 'meaning' is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the proper names. So he came to the conclusion that for a large class of cases though not for all in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: 'the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
4. In the Philosophical Investigations, the claim that one single of science exists is dropped, and introduced the view that language consists of a multitude of different, language games.

3.4 Fact and Proposition

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein argues that language is a picture of reality. This means that there must be a similarity of structure between that which pictures and that which is pictured. The form of language must be the same as that of reality. If the structure is distorted the result will be nonsense. In other words, it is only possible to formulate meaningful statement if the form of language is in accordance with the structure of reality.

According to the Tractatus, language is a picture or model of the facts. Language in other words, is not a picture of objects but of combinations of objects that constitute facts. Thought or language is for Wittgenstein the totality of significant propositions. He writes; “The thought is the significant proposition.” The totality of proposition is language. A proposition is simply the description of language. To understand a proposition means to know what is the case it is true. A proposition presents the existence and non existence of atomic facts (state of affair).

Language consists of sentence, and sentences picturing a state of affairs are elementary sentences. To say that an elementary sentence is a model on picture of state of affairs exists is to say that a state of affair exists. Thus every sentence becomes a proposition, by means of which one asserts that something is or is not the case. In the absence of the states of affairs, language will fail to convey any sense. It will simply go lame. Similarly, if a proposition is to be true, there must be actual states of affairs i.e., facts. It means that, for Wittgenstein, atomic facts are necessary for the sense and truth of language. Language is possible only if there are facts. In this sense the world is said to be the totality of facts and not of things.

But to claim that language consists only of propositions is to put a radical limitation on what language can do; and Wittgenstein came in his later work to reject this limitation. Another important point is that one elementary proposition can not contradict another elementary proposition. Unfortunately Wittgenstein provides no actual example of an elementary proposition. One of the reasons for this may be that no sentence taken from ordinary language satisfies the demands that must be for it to qualify as an elementary proposition.

Check Your Progress:

1. What are the main works of Wittgenstein?
2. What is the meaning of Language according to the Tractatus?
3. What is atomic fact?

3.5 Logical Atom

The word logical atom comes from the philosophy of Russell known as 'Logical Atomism'. Russell's philosophy exemplifies and pioneered modern analytic philosophy. Russell describes that analysis starts with the beliefs which are hazy or ambiguous, which are complex and which are felt to be certain about without knowing that it is certain. The linguistic analysis is a major theme of the philosophy of 'logical atomism'. The name 'Logical Atomism' was invented by Russell. The word 'atomism' is of course, a metaphor: just as the scientist was supposed to go on dividing object until he reached their ultimate, indivisible parts, so the philosopher's task was conceived as a kind of analysis of thought in to its ultimate simple elements Russell maintained that the analysis should deal with propositions, he qualified this as logical atomism.

The word 'atom' means invisible particle, and Russell and Wittgenstein came to believe that there must be indivisible logical particle. Logical atomism begins with statements, subject them to analysis and find that they are built up out of parts. Some parts of these parts name objects in the world. But the copula does not name in object, but many other words do.

Wittgenstein became a pupil of Russell in the second decade of the century, accepted this ideas, modified them and developed them, in a deeper way than Russell, and in the end criticised and rejected them more thoroughly and comprehensively than Russell.

According to logical atomism of Wittgenstein, the world is the totality of facts and facts consist of objects which can not exist independently. Facts are actual or possible states of affairs, which makes propositions true or false. Propositions, thus express facts. In the ultimate analysis, we get only atomic or elementary propositions, which are concatenation of names alone.

For Wittgenstein, all elementary propositions consist of names only. Ordinarily we use 'name' to designate things and persons. By 'name' Wittgenstein means a primitive sign which can neither be verbally defined nor structurally analysed. The name can not be analysed further by any definition.

But here the difficulty is that how can an elementary proposition say or state anything? A mere list of names cannot state a fact, and therefore can not be true or false as propositions are. Another puzzling feature of language connected with proposition which a person can understand what a proposition even if it has previously heard has never been explain to him what its sense is. He thought that there is only one possible way of explaining this vital and puzzling feature of language: the proposition must be a picture of the situation it describes.

SAQ:

Discuss logical atomism of Wittgenstein. (within 50 words)

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3.6 Family Resemblance

In the Tractatus a meaningful proposition was said to be one made up of the names of objects, and to serve as a picture of fact; language depicted the world. In the Philosophical Investigations language is no longer said to act like this. Picturing or depicting the world is discarded as a meaningless notion, there are many different language-games, some of which serve to describe, to assert, to report. The countless other language games that do not describe, assert or report are still languages.

Now if a language is no longer to be understood as a picture of the world, how else it to be defined? What do the different language-games have in common that entitles them to be called a language?

Wittgenstein’s answer is simple; they have nothing in common. No one definite element, no one distinctive property must be possessed by them all in order to qualify for the recognition as a language. We find only similarities.

Stop to Consider:

Wittgenstein’s analysis of Family Resemblance: ‘Consider for example the proceedings that we call *games*. I mean board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to all? Don’t say, there must be something in common, or they would not be called games -but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that....Look for example at board games,with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card games; here you find many correspondence with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball games, much that is common is retained, much is lost.-Are all they amusing? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always wining and lossing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. look at the part played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think of games like ring- a- ring- a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but now many other characteristic features have disappeared.

And we can go through the many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear’.

Wittgenstein defines his assertion of language games by comparing language-games with games in general. What have ball-games, card-games and board-games in common? He says it is no use assuming that because they are classified as games they must have a property in common. But they have not. What happens if we look at these games? We find there is no simple property common to all games, but similar properties. All members of the class of ‘game’ have instead of a common defining property what Wittgenstein calls ‘family resemblance’.

We can consider the resemblances found inside a family Peter and Paul look similar in profiles but not facial expression, while Paul and John resemble each other in the facial expression but not in profile. Peter and John bear no resemblance in facial expression or profile, but have a similar way of speaking. Peter, Paul and John have a ‘family resemblance’ but they have no one specific feature in common.

The word ‘language’ is not the name of a single phenomenon (as it is said in the Tractatus, where indeed the assertion is a crucial one); it is the class of an indefinite number of language-games. To talk about language as a single and unambiguous phenomenon would be like talking about the game, as if there is only one game.

Different language-games show a family- resemblance and the number of different language-games is indefinite. Indefinite not only because one can imagine new language-games appearing, but also because the border line of what can be called a language-game is blurred and indistinct; there is no hard edge.

Check Your Progress:

1. What is family resemblance?
2. The word ‘language’ is the name of the class of an indefinite number of language games. Is it true?
3. What do you mean by picturing?

3.7 Language Games

World and life according to Wittgenstein are very closely linked. It was pointed earlier that the world refers not so much to the universe as to the whole space in which events occur. The limits of my language are the limits of my world. Thus he raises the ‘unanswerable’ and therefore unsayable question of the meaning of life

It is true that in his later philosophy, life can be expressed to some extent in what Wittgenstein called language-games. In the *Tractatus* there is no questions of language-games. There is only a mosaic, lifeless fragments of language, atomic propositions. And these propositions, with the logical possibilities of their combination and transformation, mark out the space of what can be said.

The notion of language-games dominates Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Wittgenstein came to realize that in the *Tractatus* he had confused meaning with reference which is not true and this will limit the function of language. It is wrong to say that the meaning of a name is the thing corresponding to it. There are many languages which do not state any state of affairs. again words have various uses in language and describing the states of affairs is only one of this uses. He realizes that language is 'too complex to be reduced to a simple formula'.

Therefore, later on Wittgenstein came to reject the picture theory. Wittgenstein drew distinction between the 'surface grammer' and depth grammer. In the 'surface grammer' the construction of the language is the same in all. In order to get the meaning of an utterance, it is always necessary to penetrate below its surface grammer to its depth grammer. It is true that logic must investigate language, even ordinary language, but he points out also that there are innumerable ways in which language is used and which certainly can not be read off the surface of language on the cases of ordinary grammer, verbs, noun etc. each can be used in very different ways. This attempt to probe into the depth grammer, concealed under the surface of an over-controlled language, which leads only to mental cramp, is carried out in the analysis of language-games. Language-game that Wittgenstein introduces in his later works from a critique of the logical period. Words are not separate entities, here, mere names of isolated object, but part of lattice of human action, where language itself can be a form of actions.

The function of language, therefore is wider than that of giving descriptions which are true or false. In particular cases, languages does name or describe, but one should also take account of the many order uses of language, such as Wittgenstein mentions in his *Philosophical Investigations*: giving order, framing conjectures, making up a story, play-actioning telling a joke, translating, praying, greeting. It would appear, on the surface that the 'same' forms of words recur, such as verbs and nouns, yet in terms of its depth grammer each word has a different function.

In the practice of the use of language one party calls out the words, the other acts on them. In instruction in the language the following process will occur: the learner names to the stone. And there will be still simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the teacher.

We can think of the whole process of using words as one of these game by means of which children learn their native language. Wittgenstein calls this games 'language-games' and sometimes speaks of a primitive language as a language-game.

And the processes of naming the stones and of repeating words after someone might be called language games like ring a ring a roses. Wittgenstein calls the whole, consisting of language and the actions in to which it is woven, the 'language-game'

In the Philosophical Investigation he refers to 'the analogy between language and games.' Games means the comparison of some facts by the way of similarities and dissimilarities. Therefore analogy has a directive function and not a descriptive one. Language game is a language and 'the action in to which it is interwoven. Here the term 'language game' is meant to stress that the speaking of is a part of activity of life. Psychological phenomena like hoping, wishing, regretting etc. also the modification of the complicated 'form of life'. Therefore 'language-game' is used in many senses. But it is not possible to ask for a justification of a particular language-game.

Modern life is constantly throwing up a new daily uses of language almost analogous. Therefore to think of the uses of language as one is to freeze something which is essentially fluid. There is a very general, and not particularly philosophical sense in which people's language is related with how they see life and reality. But we can say that a great deal of the skillful use of language is directed to making others see what they did not see before.

SAQ:
What is 'Language-game'? Explain (Within 100 words).
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.....
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.....

3.8 Summing Up

Wittgenstein, along with the analogy between language and games indicates the diverse functions of linguistic activity.

For Wittgenstein neither the picture, nor the formula nor any experiences can be understood by someone if he does not know the use of them. Use can only show us that they have been understood correctly. But the private language has also

use but they can not be understood correctly because the question of truth and falsity can not arise in the field of private language since they are not grammatically indicative sentences. In order to understand the meaning of such language there must be some criteria which are common. But Wittgenstein is mistaken here because it is a prejudice and it is the claim of the old verificationists which can not be accepted.

I think at point there needs a deeper examination because Wittgenstein's work is tremendously important for showing that religious language has a use but his work does not show any of it is true, nor even how we should go about in establishing the truth in religious or private language.

In the Philosophical Investigation Wittgenstein identifies the meaning of a sentence with the use of language. But for many thinkers this identifications is misleading. Because if meaning is identical with use, in order to know the meaning, we must know the use of a sentence and in the same way in order to know the use we have to know the meaning of sentence. But it is not in all cases. In most cases, if a person had no idea how to a certain word we would not say that he does not know its meaning. Therefore Wittgenstein's identification of meaning with use is not a strong identification.

In non-linguistic area also we can't not say that the things which have uses have meanings also. E.g. many words have a use in the language but no meaning. Most proper names have a use but no meaning.

But by defending Wittgenstein we can say that the main issue on which he emphasises is that the philosophical activity is concerned with the use of words but not whether 'meaning is identical with use or not.' In doing philosophy we should not remain ignorant of the meaning. When we know the meaning we know the use. Whatever be the relation between the meaning and use, in doing philosophy the important thing is use only.

We can conclude that like the former, Wittgenstein's later philosophy also can not demand any completeness. Upon his basis views of later philosophy we need separate and detailed examination in order to justify it. The concept of language game or language as a form of proper explanation of language.

But inspite of all these we must regard Wittgenstein as the key to modern linguistic and analysis philosophy. It is Wittgenstein who takes us a step further in the history of linguistic philosophy by some of his original thinking.

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